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Abstract- In recent years the protection of biometric data
has gained increased interest from the scientific community.
Methods such as the helper data system, fuzzy extractors,
fuzzy vault and cancellable biometrics have been proposed
for protecting biometric data. Most of these methods use
cryptographic primitives and require a binary representation
from the real-valued biometric data. Hence, the similarity
of biometric samples is measured in terms of the Hamming
distance between the binary vector obtained at the enrolment
and verification phase. The number of errors depends on the
expected error probability Pe of each bit between two biometric
samples of the same subject. In this paper we introduce a
framework for analytically estimating Pe under the assumption
that the within- and between-class distribution can be modeled
by a Gaussian distribution. We present the analytic expression
of Pe as a function of the number of samples used at the
enrolment (Ne) and verification (Nv) phases. The analytic
expressions are validated using the FRGC v2 and FVC2000
biometric databases.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increased popularity of biometrics and its ap-
plication in society, privacy concerns are being raised by
privacy protection watchdogs. This has stimulated research
into methods for protecting the biometric data in order to
mitigate these privacy concerns. Numerous methods such
as the helper data system [9], [10], [11], fuzzy extractors
[2], [5], fuzzy vault [8] and cancellable biometrics [15] have
been proposed for transforming the biometric data in such a
way that the privacy is safeguarded. Several of these privacy
or template protection techniques use some cryptographic
primitives (e.g. hash functions) and error correcting codes
(ECC) and require a binary representation of the biometric
sample, referred to as the binary vector.
Fig. 1 shows a high level overview of a biometric system
that extracts a binary vector from a biometric sample, e.g. a
fingerprint image. In the enrolment phase, where the subject
presents itself to the biometric system, a biometric sample
is obtained and sent to the feature extraction module. The
biometric sample is preprocessed (enhancement, alignment,
etc.) and a real-valuedfeature vector feC RNF is extracted,
where NF is the number of feature components. In the
verification phase, another biometric sample is taken from
which its feature vector fR is extracted. In a classical
biometric system, the matcher would base its decision on the
similarity between the feature vectors f1 and fR. Because
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of the binary vector requirement, the real-valued feature
vectors are quantized, i.e. bits are extracted from each
feature component, obtaining the binary vectors fB and fB.
The quantization process turns into a binarization process
when only a single bit is extracted from each real-valued
component of the biometric sample. In the literature, various
quantization and binarization schemes have been presented
[3], [4], [9], [10]. In this paper we focus on the binarization
scheme based on thresholding, which is used in the helper
data system schemes [9], [10]. When multiple samples are
taken, a feature vector is extracted from each sample and
sent to the quantization block, which quantizes the average
feature vector.
The transition from a real-valued to a binary representation
of the biometric sample according to [9], [10] implies that the
similarity between two biometric samples can be measured
in terms of the Hamming distance, i.e. the number of
bit errors between the binary vectors. The number of bit
errors depends on the probability of each bit to change
between two biometric samples of the same subject. Each
subject will have a different error probability and we are
interested in the average error probability seen over the whole
population, referred to as the expected error probability Pe.
Because the classification performance of a biometric system
depends on the Pe of each component, the performance
could be estimated if we can estimate Pe. In this paper we
introduce a framework for analytically estimating the Pe of
each bit in the threshold-based binarization scheme under
the assumption that the real-valued features are distributed
according to Gaussian models characterized by the within-
class variance oj2 and the between-class variance o'. The
Gaussian assumption is used as the basis of our analytic
framework, because due to the central limit theorem we can
assume that the real-valued features will tend to approximate
a Gaussian distribution when they are obtained by a linear
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Fig. 1. A high level overview of a biometric system where binary vectors
are extracted.
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combinations of many components, e.g. feature extraction
techniques based on the principle component analysis (PCA)
or linear discriminant analysis (LDA). This assumption is
motivated and made plausible in Section IV. Secondly, the
Gaussian assumption makes it possible to obtain an analytical
closed-form expression for Pe. PCA or LDA techniques are
often being used to perform dimension reduction in order
to prevent overfitting or to simplify the classifier [7]. In the
field of template protection, PCA is also used to uncorrelated
the features to guarantee uniformly distributed keys extracted
from the biometric sample [2]. Our objective is to obtain an
analytical closed-form expression for Pe as a function of the
number of enrolment Ne and verification Nv samples given
the ratio (Jb/(w.
This paper is organized as follows, we first present the
real-valued Gaussian model assumption of the biometric
distribution and the binarization method in Section II. Using
this model, we formulate the analytic expression of Pe in
Section III for three cases, namely (i) the known-reference-
template case, (ii) the single sample case for both the en-
rolment and verification phase, and (iii) the multiple sample
case. In Section IV we validate these analytic expressions
with two different real biometric databases consisting of
FRGC v2 3D face images [13] and the FVC2000 fingerprint
images [12]. We finalize with the conclusions in Section V.
II. DISTRIBUTION MODEL ASSUMPTION AND
BINARIZATION METHOD
We assume that over the whole population each component
of the real-valued biometric sample fR has a Gaussian
distribution N(,Ut, o(2) with mean Ut and variance o2 where
t stands for total distribution, see Fig. 2. The total distri-
bution is a combination of the within- and between-class
distributions, which we assume to be Gaussians N(w,u, 2)
and N(,Ub, ob), respectively. The within-class distribution
characterizes the variability of multiple biometric samples
of subject i, whose mean is w,uw with variance s2.. The
between-class distribution is the probability density function
(pdf) of the means w,Lt of all subjects. For simplicity but
without loss of generality we consider Ut = ,b = 0. We
further assume that the within-class variance is the same for
each subject, i.e. o-w, = ow. Henceforth, the subject sub-
indices (i) are omitted for notation convenience unless stated
otherwise.
To binarize the components of fR, we use the thresholding
method [9], [10], in which the threshold d is equal to the
mean of the between-class distribution Ub. If the value of
a component of fR is smaller than a then it is set to "0"
otherwise it is set to "1", see Fig. 2.
III. ANALYTIC EXPRESSION FOR THE ERROR
PROBABILITY
Using the distribution model defined in Section II the
expected error probability Pe over the whole population is
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Fig. 2. Distribution model of a single component of the real-valued
biometric.
defined by
Pe = E [Pe(iw) ]
00
= f Pb (Iw)Pe (Iw) dIw,
-00
(1)
where Pe (/,w) is the error probability given p, and Pb is the
pdf of the between-class distribution. With the binarization
threshold d = ,b = 0, this problem becomes symmetric with
respect to 6. Consequently, (1) becomes
0
Pe = 2 f Pb(Y)Re(Y) dy,
-00
0
_( } ) 2
-2 f20 e R e(y)dy,
-00 2Tb
2 f e- (Ay))2e(y) dy,
-00
where A In subsequent subsections, the integral is
solved by defining Pe(y) for three different cases:
i Known reference template with a single verification
sample,
ii Single enrolment and verification sample,
iii Multiple enrolment and verification samples.
These cases are related to each other as will be explained
in Section Ill-C. The known reference template case has
a simple intuitive solution and serves as a framework for
solving the other two cases. The second case is an extension
of the first one when a single sample is used at the enrolment
and verification phase. In the third case, the final analytic
expression of Pe is obtained by extending the single sample
case to the multiple sample case.
A. Known Reference Template
In this case, the reference template obtained in the en-
rolment phase is assumed to be known and therefore p,
is known. Hence, the individual error probability for the
known-reference-template case Per is the probability that the
sample, in the verification phase, is on the other side of the
threshold d compared to ,uw. This probability is depicted by
(2)
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be simplified to
pr _ 1 X arctan (I)
e1- 1a
2 - r arctan ( X ),
= 21 1 arctani (ffb ).
(8)
B. Single Enrolment and Verification Sample
The previous case is now extended by taking into account
that the sample obtained in the enrolment phase could also
be on the other binarization side of ,uw. We restrict this
problem to the single sample case for both the enrolment and
verification phase, i.e. Ne = Nv = 1. Hence, the individual
error probability for the single sample case Pe becomes
Fig. 3. The error probability Pe (y) given by Pa(y).
the shadowed area in Fig. 3 and referred to as Pa, where
0=0
The easiest way to solve (2) is to write Pa(y) in terms of
the error function
z
erf (z) af et dt. (4)
By defining = , Pa(y) can be rewritten as
Pa(y) = af e-(I(xz-y)) dx,
0
°° 2
f e-z dz, with z = TO -y)I
-NY
00 2 -ny 2 (5)
e-z dz- e-zdz , for y < 0,
erf(-2(y)].
By using P (y) Pa(y) and substituting (5) into (2) yields
00
pr jA f e- Ay) [1 erf(-yqy)] dy,
a= fe-(A) [1 - erf(71y)] dy,
a [fe-(Ay)2 -fe-(Ay)2erf(T9y)] dy,
= [2 - f e verf(riy)] dy,
where we used the known result f0c Ae-AY) dy f. The
second term with the erf function can be rewritten using the
general solution of erf integrals given as [14]
°° 2
f e-px erf (ax)erf (bx) dx =
0
arctan ab
V/p(a2 +b2 +p)
Using (7) and by setting p = A2, a = ty, and b = oo, (6) can
Pe. (y) = (1 - Pa(Y))Pa(LY) + Pa(Y)(I - Pa(y)): (9)
where the first term on the right side is the probability of
the sample to be on the same binarization side as p, in
the enrolment phase multiplied by the probability of being
on the other side in the verification phase. The second term
is the probability for the sample to be on the other side in
the enrolment phase multiplied by the probability to be on
the same side in the verification phase. Since both terms are
equal, (2) becomes
4A e-() [Pa(y) (1
-0o
Substituting (5) into (10) yields
Pa)(y)] dy.
As f e AY)2 i - erf2(-yy)l dy,
-00
= fe-(Ay) [1 erf2(rqy)] dy,
0
00
2
> Af eA2[erf 2(,1y) dy,
(10)
(1 1)
where the integration of the erf2 function can be solved
using (7) with p = A2, and a = b = q. The analytic
expression of P,' becomes
arctan( q2
pS = 1 __ -A V /A2(X 2+n22 +X2)J
e 2 aa\
1 1 q2
=-
- arctan,2 kA 2
1
arctan2 a A 2+( )-
1 1 (rti 07b
2 7Fo7r/2 17b )
17± W~
(12)
C. Multiple Enrolment (Ne) and Verification (Ny) Samples
In this section, the analytic expression in (12) is further
extended by considering Ne samples in the enrolment and
Nv in the verification phase. The effect of taking the average
of multiple samples is that the variance of the within-class
O decreases according to
o=w
UwN
-N4U* w,N= v/N
0
Feature value
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on January 9, 2009 at 05:27 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
The definition of the individual error probability is analogous
to the single sample case by taking Ne and NV into account
Pem(y; Ne, NV) = (1 - Pa(y; Ne))Pa(y; NV) (14)
+ Pa(y; Ne)(1 - Pa(y; NV)),
where the error probability given by the area in Fig. 3 now
depends on the number of samples as
°° _t
-N(x_y) ) 2Pa(y;N) 7= vTeV)W Jdx,
o (15)
=21erf(- y) .
Hence, (14) can be expanded into
Pe (y; Ne,Nv)= ' [(1 + erf (-T/ey)) (1- erf (-Tlvy))
+ (1-erf (-Tley)) (1 + erf (-Tlvy))], (16)
=2 [1 -erf (-Tley)erf (-Tlvy)],
where 71e = 1Ne and qv = Nvr. The total error
probability for multiple samples is obtained by substituting
(16) into (2) as
0
Pm (Ne,Nv)=AJ e(AY)2 [1-erf(-Tley)erf(-Tlvy)] dy,
=A J eAY)2 [1-erf(r7ey)erf(Tlvy)] dy,
0
00
=- ee-S [1-2erf(T/ey)erf(Tlvy)]dy, 17
00
which can be solved with the use of (7) with p = A2, a(17
and b = qv as
Pem (Ne, N,)
arctan ( ev
_1_ o)2 V~N/A(n12+n2+,N2)
)- 2 +/i AVT
2- 1 arctan eNv
7Ne+Nv+(A)2
,_ (4,_J_ 7h\ /
- arctan2 7r
KD V _a_v
7W ;N,+N, + ( wb ) -2
The relationship between the three cases is now evident. For
Ne -> oo and NV = 1 , the solution of the multiple sample
case (18) converges to the solution of the known-reference-
template case (8). Indeed, since Ne -> oo, the position of 11w
with respect to the binarization threshold is precisely known.
Note that the same convergence occurs when Ne = 1 and
NV --> cx. In addition, for Ne = NV = 1 the multiple sample
case (18) becomes the single sample case (12).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, the analytic expressions and the effect of
the assumption of Gaussian distributions are validated using
two real biometric databases. The first one (dbl) consists of
3D face images from the FRGC v2 database [13], where we
used the shape-based 3D face recognizer of [6] to extract
feature vectors of dimension NF = 696. Subjects with
at least 8 samples are selected resulting into 230 subjects
with a total of 3147 samples. The second database (db2)
consists of fingerprint images from Database 2 of FVC2000
[12], and uses the feature extraction algorithm based on
Gabor filters and directional fields [1] where NF = 1536.
There are 110 subjects with 8 samples each. We applied the
PCA dimension reduction technique on each database. We
computed the PCA transformation matrix by using all the
samples of the database, and we reduced the dimension of
the feature vectors until the optimum performance in terms of
the equal error rate (EER) was obtained. The EER is defined
at the point where the false acceptance rate (FAR) equals
the false rejection rate (FRR). For db 1, the optimal reduced
dimension is at 88 components while 83 for db2.
As described in Section II, the analytic framework is based
on the Gaussian model assumption. Fig. 4(a)(c) show the
normal probability plot of each component of the feature
vectors of db1 and db2 respectively, before PCA has been
applied. The normal probability plot is a graphical technique
for assessing whether or not a data set is approximately
Gaussian distributed. Prior to comparing, we normalized
each component to a unit variance and subtracted its mean
to make it zero-mean. For both databases it is evident that
the distributions are not Gaussian, because they significantly
deviate from the dashed-dotted line that depicts a perfect
Gaussian distribution. Fig. 4 (b)(d) depict the normal prob-
ability plot of the components of db1 and db2 respectively,
after applying PCA. For both databases the figures show that
after applying PCA the features tend to behave more like
Gaussians. Nevertheless, the tails of the distribution deviate
the most from being Gaussian.
To assess the model assumptions, we compare the esti-
mated bit error probability of the feature components of the
biometric database peb with the corresponding analytically
obtained Pem given by (18). The test protocol per feature
component is as follows: Pe'b is calculated as the average
over the error probability Pe, of each subject. The subject
error probability Pe, is calculated by performing 200 matches
and determining the relative number of errors. For each
match, Ne distinct features are randomly selected, averaged
and binarized (enrolment phase). The obtained bit is com-
pared against bit obtained from averaging and binarizing
NV different randomly selected features of the same subject
(verification phase). To evaluate Pem, the parameters (Jb, (Wl,
Ne and NV are needed for each component. The estimated
standard deviation of the between-class distribution (Jb iS
calculated as the standard deviation over the average feature
vector of all subjects. For the within-class distribution 8-, is
computed as the average standard deviation of each subject.
The comparison between pe1b and Pem is shown in Fig. 5
for both dbl and db2. Fig. 5(a)(d) show the comparison for
the features prior to PCA for the Ne = NV = 1 case, while
Fig. 5(b)(e) show the features after PCA for the Ne = NV =
1 case, and Fig. 5(c)(f) Ne = NV = 3 show the features after
PCA for the Ne = NV = 3 case. In all figures, three lines are
given. The solid line represents the average bit error probabil-
ity as a function of Jbjo-, according to the analytical model
of Section II with known Gaussian distributions. From these
Gaussian distributions, for a given (Jb/(JW, two synthetic
databases db 1* and db2* are drawn with the same number of
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on January 9, 2009 at 05:27 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
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Fig. 4. Normal probability plot of each feature vector component of dbl and db2 before and after applying PCA.
samples as db and db2, respectively (i.e. db 1* contains 230
individuals and db2* contains 110 individuals with 8 samples
each). For each subject, we randomly generate w,Lt according
to N(,ub, oJ2) and generated 8 samples from N(w,u, of2). For
each synthetic database db 1* and db2*, the average bit error
probabilities are estimated using the same test protocol as
used to estimate peb. For the same value of (Jb and o
500 synthetic databases are generated which allows us to
estimate the distribution of the average error probability for
a given bjb/o-w as well as the 95 percentile interval of the
distribution. By repeating this process for a range of (Jb/0-w
values, the overall 95 percentile area can be determined
which is indicated by the dashed and dashed-dotted lines.
This indicates the area where 95% of the estimated average
bit error probabilities using the databases db 1 and db 2 would
fall if they would satisfy the assumptions of the analytical
model. Because of its smaller size, db2 has a larger 95
percentile area than dbl.
Fig. 5 shows that there is a smaller difference between Pem
and pedb when PCA has been applied, which strengthens the
assumption that by applying PCA the features will tend to
approximate a Gaussian distribution on which this analytic
framework is based. When PCA has been applied, in most
cases Peb is estimated within the 95 percentile boundaries.
In the Ne = Nv = 1 case, the pedb of three features for both
dbl and db2 slightly fall outside the boundaries, which is
well within the 95 percent of 88 and 85 respectively. In the
Ne = Nv = 3 case, there are six cases outside the boundary
for db and four for db2, where four would be allowed by
the 95 percent boundary.
Possible causes for the observed deviations are (i) the
limited size of the database which also has an influence
on the estimation error of (Jb and &-, (ii) the Gaussian
assumption of the feature vector distribution, and (iii) the
outliers in the biometric samples of the databases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a framework for analytically estimating
the bit error probability when comparing binary vectors
extracted in the enrolment and the verification phase. Having
the error probability of each bit, the expected Hamming
distance between the enrolment and verification binary vec-
tors can be determined. Hence, a bound on the performance
of the biometric system can be formulated. We focused on
formulating the analytical error probability for the threshold-
ing binarization method under the assumption that the real-
valued biometric sample is distributed according to Gaussian
models characterized by the within-class variance 2 and the
between-class variance '-2
We derived the analytic expression of Pe for three cases,
namely (i) the known reference template with a single
verification sample Pe, (ii) the single enrolment and ver-
ification sample Pe, and (iii) the multiple enrolment and
verification sample Pem. The latter case has resulted in a
general analytical expression from which case (i) and (ii)
can be derived. We validated the analytic expressions using
two real biometric database: i) 3D face images from a subset
of the FRGC v2 database with 230 subjects and a total of
3147 samples, and ii) fingerprint images from the FVC2000
...
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Fig. 5. Comparison between 11db and Pm for the feature components of databases dbl and db2. The lower and upper boundaries (LB and UB) indicate
the 95 percentile area of the estimated error probability when using a synthetic database of similar size.
database with 110 subjects and 880 samples in total. By using
normal probability plots, we have shown that when applying
PCA, the resulting features tend to better approximate a
Gaussian distribution and thus the analytic framework has
a much better fit with real biometric data if PCA has been
applied. Furthermore, a good fit was observed between the
analytic and calculated error probability for both biometric
databases for both the Ne = NV = 1 and Ne = NV = 3
settings. In all but one setting, the number of occurrences
where the analytic error probability Pm was outside the given
95 percentile boundary was smaller than what was allowed.
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